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GHANA AND THE IDEAL OF THE CITIZEN-
SHAREHOLDER: A CORPORATE-LAW 
RESPONSE TO THE RESOURCE CURSE 
JAMES G. SIMPSON† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Note assesses Ghana’s legal regime for managing revenues 
from its newfound petroleum reserves as a means of combatting the 
resource curse—the well-documented political and economic 
phenomenon wherein resource-rich countries experience greater levels 
of corruption and poor governance and weaker democracy and 
economic growth than resource-poor nations. The Ghanaian regime 
fails to provide systemic protections against the resource curse by (1) 
supplying insufficient economic development and poverty relief, (2) 
lacking incentives and mechanisms for overseeing and holding 
accountable the powers responsible for managing petroleum 
revenues, and (3) providing insufficient channels for spreading the 
economic benefits of extraction beyond the petroleum sector. This 
Note undertakes a comparative study of a representative group of 
petroleum revenue-management regimes—those of Alaska, Norway, 
Indonesia, and Trinidad and Tobago—in search of an effective 
regime that might be transplanted to Ghana. Finding that none of 
these regimes are adequately applicable to Ghana’s economic, social, 
or political context, this Note goes on to propose a novel regime for 
petroleum revenue management in Ghana, drawing on principles of 
U.S. corporate law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Substantial oil reserves were discovered in Ghanaian waters just 
west of Cape Three Points in 2007, the culmination of a search that 
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began in earnest in the 1960s.1 Named commensurate with the size of 
the find, the Jubilee oil field was discovered by a joint venture 
between the Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNPC),2 Kosmos 
Energy, and Tullow Oil, and was thought to signal Ghana’s “potential 
transformation into a dynamic middle-income nation, free to choose 
its own development path.”3 This discovery was certainly cause for 
jubilation, with estimates that the Jubilee field contains recoverable 
reserves of 615 million barrels of crude oil and 769 billion cubic feet 
of natural gas,4 discovery of twenty-three new oil fields since 2007,5 
and International Monetary Fund projections that Ghana will bring in 
around US$20 billion in oil revenues.6 
In the meantime, the nation and its private-sector partners have 
been plowing ahead in developing Ghana’s reserves. Indeed, a 
number of events that seemed to threaten the stability of the 
relationship between the government and the developers did little to 
slow down progress. Not even a dramatic ouster of the New Patriotic 
Party (NPP) in the 2008 national elections by the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC), nor boundary disputes with the Ivory 
Coast could stop the parties from bringing the Jubilee field to 
production on schedule in December 2010.7 Nor could a GNPC 
official’s apparently baseless allegations that Kosmos violated the 
 
 1. Ransford Gyampo, Saving Ghana from Its Oil: A Critical Assessment of Preparations 
So Far Made, 4 AFR. RES. REV. 1, 1–2 (2010). 
 2. The GNPC is a state-owned corporation that currently holds title to Ghana’s petroleum 
reserves and represents the government in development projects and negotiations. IAN GARY, 
OXFAM AM., GHANA’S BIG TEST: OIL’S CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 38 
(2009), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa3/files/ghanas-big-test.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CZR-
Q5JY]. The GNPC maintains the government’s financial stake in the projects and serves as a de 
facto regulator of the industry through contractual-monitoring rights. Id. The existence of this 
de facto regime is largely attributable to the fact that the nation’s petroleum expertise is 
concentrated in the GNPC. Id. at 36. 
 3. William Wallis, Oil: Nation Eager to Remain Master of its Own Destiny, FIN. TIMES 
(Dec. 14, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f39dba34-236a-11e1-af98-00144feabdc
0.html#axzz3GoFDXr8E [http://perma.cc/KK4R-VCHU]. 
 4. PUB. INTEREST & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., REPORT ON MANAGEMENT OF 
PETROLEUM REVENUES FOR THE PERIOD 1ST JANUARY 2013 TO 30TH JUNE 2013, at 6, 
http://www.piacghana.org/2013PIAC_Semi-Annual_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/4XW8-VKSY] 
[hereinafter 2013 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT].  
 5. Id. at 25. 
 6. Dominik Kopiński, Andrzej Polus & Wojciech Tycholiz, Resource Curse or Resource 
Disease? Oil in Ghana, 122 AFR. AFF. 583, 594 (2013). The GNPC estimates that the 
government revenues will amount to at least 38 percent of gross oil production. Id. 
 7. Wallis, supra note 3. The ouster of the NPP was of special concern to developers, as 
they had very a strong relationship with the party and the president. Id. 
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.8 In fact, so eager were the parties to 
get the oil and money flowing that production began, and has 
continued for several years, without any comprehensive regulation of 
petroleum extraction and maintenance. Ghana’s Petroleum 
Exploration and Production Law remains a work in progress, though 
the government did manage to have the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act (PRMA) in place to at least regulate the flow of 
revenues from petroleum production.9 The Ghanaian Ministry of 
Energy has also attempted to bring some direction to the exploration 
and production process by putting together an Energy Sector Strategy 
and Development Plan; however, “so far the results have been, at 
best, mixed, as the implementation of the development plans seems to 
focus more on economic growth and short-term revenue generation 
and less on sustainability.”10 It is within this context that oil 
production grew to 99,685 barrels per day by the end of 2013, closing 
in on the target peak-production level of 120,000 barrels per day.11 
Amid the jubilation and the rush to create much-needed 
revenue, many commentators received the news with trepidation, 
fearing that the “resource curse” will beset the emerging democracy.12 
The risk of a resource curse is especially troubling to commentators 
because Ghana is widely considered to be a beacon of hope for 
functional African democracies.13 The “resource curse”—the well-
 
 8. Tensions were understandably running high after Kosmos had to undertake great 
expense to prove to regulators that the allegations were false, which U.S. authorities ultimately 
accepted. Henny Sender, Bribery: Lines Less Blurred, FIN. TIMES (July 18, 2011, 4:08 AM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/382eb374-b0a7-11e0-a5a7-00144feab49a.html?siteedition=intl#
axzz3HqVxn5nT [http://perma.cc/N3WY-U7DE]. 
 9. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 591–92. 
 10. Id. at 590. 
 11. PUB. INTEREST & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., REPORT ON MANAGEMENT OF 
PETROLEUM REVENUES FOR YEAR 2013, at 14, http://www.piacghana.org/2013
PIACAReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/4KAF-EBJ2] [hereinafter 2013 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 12. See generally Peter Arthur, Avoiding the Resource Curse in Ghana: Assessing the 
Options, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS: TOWARDS CRITICAL 
ENVIRONMENT SECURITY 108, 108–27 (Matthew A. Schnurr & Larry A. Swatuk eds., 2012) 
(considering ways to avoid the resource curse for petroleum in Ghana); Clemens Breisinger, 
Xinshen Diao, Rainer Schweickert & Manfred Wiebelt, Managing Future Oil Revenues in 
Ghana: An Assessment of Alternative Allocation Options, 22 AFR. DEV. REV. 303 (2010) (same); 
Gyampo, supra note 1 (same); Todd Moss & Lauren Young, Saving Ghana from Its Oil: The 
Case for Direct Cash Contribution (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 186, Oct. 2009), 
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1422981_file_Saving_Ghana_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.
cc/SN9W-GYW5] (same). 
 13. See, e.g., WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2014, at 96 (2014), 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjp_rule_of_law_index_2014_report.pdf 
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documented phenomenon that “resource-rich developing states are 
more prone to bad governance, corruption, and rent-seeking behavior 
that can lead to a weaker democracy”14—is of special concern given 
the economic stagnation and civil unrest surrounding nearby Nigeria’s 
large oil-extraction industry,15 where the curse has become so severe 
as to inspire militant groups to rise up against the Nigerian 
government in the Niger River Delta.16 Moreover, Ghana has 
additional cause for concern, as the former “Gold Coast” has already 
battled a resource curse for much of its history with the gold-mining 
industry.17 As such, recommendations have come pouring in from 
commentators on how Ghana may avoid a petroleum-based iteration 
of the resource curse.18 
This Note evaluates Ghana’s existing legal regime, determines 
that Ghana is at risk of succumbing to the resource curse, and offers a 
new remedy. Part I explains the resource curse and Ghana’s existing 
legal regime for managing petroleum revenues, concluding that the 
latter is not well-suited to prevent the former. That determination is 
based on three abstract problems found in the current Ghanaian 
system: (1) a failure to provide for sufficient economic development 
and poverty relief, (2) a lack of incentives and means for overseeing 
and holding accountable the powers responsible for managing 
petroleum revenue, and (3) an absence of channels through which to 
 
[http://perma.cc/J389-T3R4] (ranking Ghana as the country with the second-best rule of law in 
its eighteen-country region); Gyampo, supra note 1, at 2 (“Ghana is recognized as an oasis of 
peace in a sub-region bedeviled with several violent conflict [sic] related to elections, natural 
resources, like oil, diamond, gold, etc.”); Moss & Young, supra note 12, at 2 (“By most of the 
common political and economic measures, Ghana has been highly successful, especially relative 
to other developing countries or its own West African neighbors.”); Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, THE WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases/rule-of-law 
[http://perma.cc/D7RF-YNTZ] (last updated Sept. 27, 2013) (ranking Ghana many percentage 
points higher on all of the World Bank’s rule-of-law variables than its regional neighbors). 
 14. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 584. 
 15. See generally Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the Natural 
Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 9804, June 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9804 [http://perma.cc/X579-DPCZ] (linking 
the socioeconomic woes of Nigeria with the resource curse). 
 16. See Oil Workers Flee Attacks by Militants in Nigeria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A13 
(“Insurgents, known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, or MEND, 
started a campaign of violence in early 2006 seeking more local control of the impoverished 
region’s oil wealth.”); BIG MEN (Rachel Boynton 2014) (interviewing militants actively fighting 
the Nigerian central government in the Niger River Delta). 
 17. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 585. 
 18. See supra note 12 (recommending how Ghana can best manage its oil revenue to avoid 
the resource curse). 
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spread the economic benefits of extraction beyond the petroleum 
sector. Part II presents a comparative study of alternative legal 
regimes for managing petroleum revenues—those of Alaska, Norway, 
Indonesia, and Trinidad and Tobago. None of these options provide 
an optimal solution for Ghana, but they do suggest two key principles 
for combatting the resource curse: (1) any entity controlling 
petroleum resources and revenues should be accountable to a 
constituency with the means and incentive to check its power, and (2) 
this constituency must be able to stay informed through transparent 
disclosure of the state of the industry and revenues. Finally, Part III 
builds these principles into a proposed legal regime for managing 
Ghana’s petroleum revenues. 
The proposed regime is based on what this Note terms the ideal 
of the citizen-shareholder, by which Ghanaian citizens would be given 
a direct stake in the nation’s petroleum profits and governance. This 
would essentially involve disaggregating a large part of petroleum 
revenues and governance from the existing political regime by vesting 
them in GNPC, which will then issue the rights to the revenues and 
governance directly to the Ghanaian people in the form of stock. 
Though it is not without its difficulties, this proposal would help 
facilitate economic development, reduce the risk of an enclave 
petroleum economy,19 and provide transparency and oversight by 
giving Ghanaian citizens an incentive to ensure proper management 
by means of a direct financial stake in the outcome. In doing so, this 
ideal of the citizen-shareholder specifically addresses those 
weaknesses in the current Ghanaian legal regime that place the 
nation at risk of developing a resource-cursed economy and society. 
Ghana should therefore leave the property rights in its offshore oil 
with the GNPC and relinquish its shares to the Ghanaian citizens. 
I.  GHANA AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
As massive amounts of money begin to flow into government 
coffers from the oil business,20 it is worth asking, what exactly is the 
 
 19. An enclave petroleum economy is one in which the production of a nation’s petroleum 
resources provides few positive externalities to the economy writ large, thus depriving that 
nation’s citizens of many of the benefits of their natural resources. See infra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
 20. The Ghanaian government reported petroleum revenues totaling US$978,017,692 in 
2014. PUB. INTEREST & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., REPORT ON MANAGEMENT OF 
PETROLEUM REVENUES FOR YEAR 2014: ANNUAL REPORT 27–28 (2014), http://
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risk? What is it about money from natural resources that has proven 
such a curse for developing nations, especially in Africa? Answering 
these questions is key to understanding both potential problems that 
might arise as Ghana manages extractive industries and how to 
formulate an effective response. 
A. Petroleum and the Resource Curse 
Much of the literature on the resource curse arises from the 
proven, counterintuitive observations that resource-rich economies 
tend to be outperformed by resource-poor economies, and that the 
abundance of natural resources is negatively correlated with 
economic growth.21 The problem is especially exaggerated in oil 
economies.22 This phenomenon is explained by two major 
macroeconomic observations. First, natural-resource extraction 
carries few positive externalities.23 Indeed, “[e]xtractive industry 
investment creates enclave economies where the investments have 
few linkages to the rest of the economy and few jobs are created.”24 
Second, the world price volatility associated with natural resources 
drags economies dependent on them.25 Therefore, from the outset, it 
would seem that an effective response to large-scale natural resource 
extraction would require a means of spreading natural-resource 
profits to other sectors of the economy to reduce enclaving and 
dependence. 
 
piacghana.org/2014PIAC.pdf [http://perma.cc/4BCX-HHEC] [hereinafter 2014 ANNUAL 
REPORT]. This is up from US$846,767,184 in 2013. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 20. 
 21. See generally Jeffery D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and 
Economic Growth (Ctr. for Int’l Dev. & Harvard Ctr. for Int’l Dev. Working Paper, 1997), 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/warner_files/natresf5.pdf [http://perma.cc/6LZW-4S6B] 
(discussing several theories explaining this counter-intuitive result). 
 22. Id. at 14–15. 
 23. Id. at 4. 
 24. GARY, supra note 2, at 12. The extractive industries create enclave economies because 
they require little labor from the locality and the local labor that they do require does not result 
in significant amounts of skill accumulation by individual employees. Sachs & Warner, supra 
note 21, at 4–7. As such, extractive industries do not generate many externalities, and social 
wealth does not grow much beyond the return on private investment. Id. This stands in contrast 
to manufacturing, which produces social good well beyond the return on private investment by 
creating many jobs, which teach skills that increase overall productivity in society. Id. at 5. In 
fact, extractive industries tend to push more capital and labor away from the economic sectors 
that do create broad positive externalities (manufacturing) and into nontradable sectors 
(services), which support the extractive industries but generate little social benefit. Id. at 6. 
 25. Sachs & Warner, supra note 21, at 9. 
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Such macroeconomic problems with natural-resource 
abundance, however, are exacerbated by problems of political 
economy. For example, “[w]ith ‘easy’ money rolling in, many 
countries often reduce their efforts at non-oil revenue collection. 
When this happens, petrodollars replace more stable and sustainable 
tax revenue streams.”26 Moreover, there is a widespread perception 
that “natural resource abundance inevitably leads to greater 
corruption and inefficient bureaucracies; or that high rents distract 
governments from investing in the ability to produce growth 
supporting public goods, such as infrastructure or legal codes.”27 Such 
behavior is compounded by what economists Philip Lane and Aaron 
Tornell have termed the “voracity effect,” in which multiple powerful 
groups within a resource-rich society clamor to obtain resource rents, 
leading to widespread rent-seeking behavior and attendant 
deadweight economic loss.28 Additional troubles arise from the 
tendency of such governments to waste rents through ill-advised 
consumption or poor investment.29 Indeed, the public spending that 
such governments do undertake tends to be financed by a “borrowing 
spree[] based on their new ‘credit worthiness,’” and ultimately feeds 
into wasteful patronage systems.30 Finally, it appears that economic 
growth in such nations is further burdened by mismanagement and 
kleptocratic governments.31 
As might be expected from the economic stagnation attending 
natural-resource abundance, the resource curse also negatively 
impacts a democracy’s ability to effectively govern itself in the 
absence of strong, preexisting governmental institutions.32 Indeed, an 
empirical study by Michael Lewin Ross finds strong statistical 
 
 26. GARY, supra note 2, at 11; see also BIG MEN, supra note 16 (filming Norwegian 
Minister of Environment Erik Solheim giving a speech to stakeholders in Ghana’s oil business 
in which he urged the government not to become lazy when it comes to collecting other sources 
of revenue). 
 27. Sachs & Warner, supra note 21, at 9. 
 28. Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect, 1 J. ECON. 
GROWTH 213, 239 (1996). 
 29. Sachs & Warner, supra note 21, at 10. 
 30. GARY, supra note 2, at 11. 
 31. See BIG MEN, supra note 16 (documenting widespread and large-scale theft of Nigerian 
oil through the process of “bunkering” (stealing oil directly from pipelines) by both criminal 
groups and government officials, and through oil-company employees illegally selling 
“condensate fuel” (low-grade gasoline) under the table to black-market purchasers). 
 32. See generally Matthew L. Norman, Note, The Challenges of State Building in Resource 
Rich Nations, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 173 (2012) (describing the tendency of 
governmental weakness and failure in the presence of abundant natural resources). 
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evidence that the presence of oil and other types of mineral wealth 
tends to have a strong negative correlation with democratization and 
a positive association with repression and resistance to democracy.33 
Much of this problem arises from the fact that leaders of 
resource-rich nations have no incentive to develop the sort of strong 
institutions that are critical to an effective state, such as those 
involved in taxation and protecting property rights.34 In fact, the lack 
of effective state institutions can misalign the incentive structures of 
government leaders to the extent that “in some instances, a shrewd 
leader of a resource-rich nation will deliberately seek to shrink every 
other sector of the economy in order to prevent economic change and 
the social forces and competitors for power [that] economic change 
tends to produce.”35 
The incentives facing leaders of resource-rich nations can often 
point directly away from establishing a functioning democracy. What 
such leaders truly value—more than governing effectively or 
protecting individual liberties—is controlling the state and its 
attendant resource revenues: “Access to resource rents may make 
control of the state so valuable, and give winners such complete 
power to punish losers, that relations between the state and those 
mobilizing for representation degrade into violence.”36 In fact, there is 
concern that the leaders of resource-rich nations use government 
proceeds to subsidize potential human-rights abuses.37 The presence 
of natural resources tends to increase the risk of rebellion and civil 
war, presumably because a government’s natural-resource wealth 
provides a tempting target for dissenters.38 Such violence, however, 
 
 33. Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325, 356–57 (2001). 
 34. Norman, supra note 32, at 43–44. 
 35. Id. at 42. 
 36. Id. at 45. 
 37. See IAN GARY & NIKKI REISCH, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVS. & BANK INFO. CTR., 
CHAD’S OIL: MIRACLE OR MIRAGE?: FOLLOWING THE MONEY IN AFRICA’S NEWEST PETRO-
STATE 42 (2005), http://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Chads-Oil-Miracle-
or-Mirage.pdf [http://perma.cc/5TPF-ZQJ7] (describing how President Idriss Déby of Chad 
used oil proceeds to purchase weapons); Annalisa M. Leibold, Note, Aligning Incentives for 
Development: The World Bank and the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 167, 
168 (2011) (same). 
 38. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, On Economic Causes of Civil War, 50 OXFORD ECON. 
PAPERS 563, 571 (1998). But see Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the 
Developing World, 1960–1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 232, 232 (arguing that “oil wealth is robustly 
associated with more durable regimes and significantly related to lower levels of protest and 
civil war”). However, where there are exceptionally large amounts of natural resources, the 
incidence of civil war tends to decrease, presumably due to the strength of the government 
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may be caused by other factors given the abject failure of most 
resource-rich nations to give dissenting voices an outlet through 
democratic institutions.39 
Even when peaceful elections do occur, incumbents enjoy the 
massive advantage of being able to access the state’s vast resources 
and pour them into patronage systems and public welfare in order to 
ensure their popularity and ultimate victory.40 Moreover, when 
incumbents are at risk of losing their powerful stake they are 
incentivized to further loot the state while they have access to its 
coffers,41 as happened in Nigeria,42 leaving less and less money for 
running an effective democratic state. 
Combatting the roots of the resource curse in political economy 
requires serious managerial oversight. Indeed, given the strong 
incentive for personal or factional aggrandizement in a resource-rich 
political economy, there likely needs to be a powerful, peaceful, 
institutionalized force to keep incumbents in check, the most obvious 
being democracy.43 At its most basic level, this suggests a need for a 
means of popular control, a reason for the exercise of popular 
control, and a means of informing popular control. A strategy for 
combatting the resource curse in Ghana will need to address these 
issues, as well as those macroeconomic considerations noted above.44 
B. Ghana’s Efforts to Avoid the Resource Curse 
Ghana is a nation of 25 million people with a gross domestic 
product of US$90.41 billion, or approximately US$3,500 per capita,45 
which translates into less than two dollars a day for around 80 percent 
 
funded by such wealth. Collier & Hoeffler, supra, at 571. Such nations include those with strong 
preexisting government institutions or the powerful autocracies of the Middle East. See id. at 
573 (listing the surveyed nations that did and did not experience civil war between 1960 and 
1992). 
 39. See generally Ross, supra note 33 (arguing that the increased risk of civil war in 
resource-rich countries is due to rebels’ desire to capture a rich government treasury). 
 40. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.  
 41. See supra notes 28, 31 and accompanying text. 
 42. See BIG MEN, supra note 16 (“Between 1960 and 1999, Nigerian officials stole or 
wasted more than $440 billion. The country is consistently ranked one of the most corrupt in the 
world.”). 
 43. Norman, supra note 32, at 7. 
 44. Namely, the lack of positive externalities of natural-resource extraction and price 
volatility of the resulting commodities. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 45. The World Factbook: Ghana, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html [https://perma.cc/75S3-TQ7C] (last 
updated June 22, 2014) [hereinafter Ghana Factbook]. 
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of Ghanaians.46 Its economy is based upon commodity exports, 
primarily gold, cocoa, and now oil, and is seen by some as a relatively 
strong economy,47 and by others as one with serious cause for 
concern.48 The nation has a winner-take-all two-party political system 
characterized by government overspending and pork-barrel politics.49 
This system nevertheless remains strong due to a small political class 
with a robust network of informal relationships that helps stabilize 
the system and widespread civic awareness of political issues.50 
Indeed, the strength of Ghana’s civil society is primarily attributable 
to a large and active community of Nongovernmental Organizations 
(NGOs) that work to monitor the government and lend it their 
expertise.51 Ghana is widely seen as a model for sub-Saharan African 
democracy despite poverty, reliance on natural resources, and 
contentious politics.52 Indeed, the Ghanaian government remained 
stable throughout the highly contentious 2008 election of President 
John Atta Mills and the constitutional succession of John Dramani 
Mahama upon Mills’s death in 2012.53 With a stable government and 
serious poverty issues, it is little wonder that Ghana has been in a 
hurry to exploit its petroleum wealth.54 At the same time, however, 
any legal regime for managing that wealth should carefully consider 
Ghana’s strengths, like its democracy, and its weaknesses, like its 
undiversified economy and serious poverty. 
Although Ghana will reap massive windfalls from its oil reserves, 
the nation has only a twenty- to thirty-year production period,55 which 
means that the government will need to carefully manage its oil 
revenues in order to share that prosperity with future generations and 
 
 46. GARY, supra note 2, at 2. 
 47. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 588–89. 
 48. See generally FELIX OPPONG, DILEK AYKUT & GREGORY SMITH, THE WORLD BANK, 
GHANA ECONOMIC UPDATE: OCTOBER 2014, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/10/27/000333037_20141027091747/Rendered/PDF/918090
WP0Ghana043B00PUBLIC000web30.pdf [http://perma.cc/H3GE-BFVR] (explaining how the 
macroeconomic conditions have continued to deteriorate). 
 49. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 587–88. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 593 (describing the strong role that NGOs play in Ghanaian civil society). 
 52. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 53. Adam Nossiter, John Atta Mills, President of Ghana, Dies at 68, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/africa/john-atta-mills-ghanas-president-dies-
68.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/47C5-HNF9]. 
 54. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 55. GARY, supra note 2, at 3. 
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ensure its long-term success. Accordingly, the Ghanaian government 
prioritized the Petroleum Revenue Management Act,56 which will 
help allocate the funds coming in through royalties, equity holdings, 
corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, duties, and the like.57 All such 
revenues are managed by the Bank of Ghana,58 which is responsible 
for allocating them according to a statutory formula between the 
government’s general account in the Annual Budget Funding 
Amount (ABFA), the Ghana Stabilization Fund, and the Ghana 
Heritage Fund.59 The ABFA is made up of oil revenues that go 
directly into the national budget60 and can be spent for any purpose 
the legislature wishes.61 “The government deliberately set up two 
separate funds to insulate long-term savings from short-term 
economic pressures: while the Stabilization Fund is structured to 
safeguard the budget against year-to-year fluctuation [in oil 
prices] . . . the Heritage Fund is intended to protect the livelihood of 
future generations . . . .”62 The Heritage Fund operates as a typical 
sovereign-wealth fund, investing excess government revenues to 
produce economic returns that will support future generations. The 
Stabilization Fund “can be drawn down in the event of a sudden 
shortfall in petroleum revenues (but not one that stems from poor 
revenue collection) to provide financing for any ongoing projects and 
ensure budget sustainability.”63 
Consistent with Ghana’s thriving democratic character, the 
PRMA sets out clear allocation rules for petroleum revenue as 
between the ABFA, Stabilization Fund, and Heritage Fund. When 
setting the nation’s annual budget, the government must project its oil 
 
 56. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 591–92.  
 57. Id. at 594. 
 58. Petroleum Revenue Management Act § 2(1) (Act No. 815/2011) (Ghana), 
http://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/Petroleum_Revenue_Management_Act_%2
02011.pdf [http://perma.cc/737A-Y7J4]. The Bank of Ghana is a semi-independent government 
agency whose board of directors and governors are appointed by the President of Ghana in 
consultation with the Council of State. About the Bank, BANK OF GHANA (Feb. 7, 2011, 3:46 
PM), http://www.bog.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=130%3Abank-
of-ghana&catid=64&Itemid=137 [https://perma.cc/SV7Y-TSQC]. The Bank is primarily 
responsible for controlling the Ghanaian currency, regulating the financial sector, and serving as 
banker and financial advisor to the Ghanaian government. Id. 
 59. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 599–600. This system drew inspiration from the 
examples of Norway and Trinidad and Tobago. See infra Parts II.B, II.D. 
 60. Id. at 600. 
 61. Id. at 600 n.63. 
 62. Id. at 600. 
 63. Id. 
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revenues for the coming year—the Benchmark Revenue—70 percent 
of which then constitutes the ABFA.64 At the end of the year, all 
actual excess revenues are then divided between the Stabilization 
Fund and Heritage Fund at 70 percent and 30 percent respectively.65 
The Ghana Revenue Authority oversees and regulates the allocation 
of these funds.66 Moreover, the government has set up the Public 
Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) to monitor and 
evaluate the government’s petroleum-revenue collection and 
management, and to ensure that the public is well informed of how 
the government is doing so.67 
C. The Persistent Risk 
The existing framework looks attractive but does not fully 
address the risks of the resource curse present in Ghana and leaves 
the nation vulnerable in certain respects. The PRMA does not do 
enough to pull money out of the oil industry to combat the 
macroeconomic aspect of the resource curse or, most importantly, to 
combat poverty—the very reason for the initial jubilation.68 
Additionally, the oversight and governance regimes do not appear to 
be functioning properly and threaten to exacerbate the dangers of the 
resource curse rooted in political economy. Indeed, the outstanding 
democratic progress made by Ghanaians needs to be further 
complemented by a petroleum revenue-management regime that will 
curb the risk of poverty, mismanagement, and macroeconomic 
weakness. 
1. Revenue Projection and Maintenance.  Although the petroleum 
revenue-allocation process may seem relatively straightforward and 
transparent, major questions and risks surrounding this process still 
persist. One element that remains unclear is the process by which 
Ghana reaches its annual oil-price assumption in calculating the 
Benchmark Revenue (and, thus, the ABFA).69 That assumption is the 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 594–95. 
 67. Id. at 596–97. 
 68. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 69. GARY, supra note 2, at 45; see also PUB. INTEREST & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., 
REPORT ON MANAGEMENT OF PETROLEUM REVENUES FOR YEAR 2012: ANNUAL REPORT, at 
vi (2012), http://www.piacghana.org/2012%20PIAC%20Annual%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
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key variable that could allow the Ghanaian government to seriously 
under- or overfund itself. The government has thus far not fared very 
well in projecting oil revenues that are reasonably close to the actual 
revenues.70 The risks associated with overfunding are thus particularly 
acute given that the national budget lacks the capacity to absorb 
windfalls: the budget could handle an additional US$250–300 million, 
“but ‘nothing like $400 million to $500 million.’”71 That lack of 
absorptive capacity is one strong reason why oil funds outside of the 
government budget were needed.72 
Ghana must carefully manage its petroleum revenues to ensure 
that it is able to achieve serious development on a long-term basis and 
to overcome widespread poverty. Under the current system, this 
specifically requires government planners to avoid the problems of 
absorptive capacity by projecting petroleum revenues accurately73 and 
to ensure that the Heritage Fund can produce sustainable returns.74 
Satisfying both of these requirements is, however, extremely difficult 
 
HRB9-5QAM] [hereinafter 2012 ANNUAL REPORT] (recommending that the Ministry of 
Finance disclose such assumptions). 
 70. See 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 27–28 (underestimating revenues); 2013 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 (underestimating revenues); 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 69, at 13 (overestimating revenues); PUB. INTEREST & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., 
REPORT ON PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT FOR 2011: ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2011), 
http://www.piacghana.org/PIACREPORT2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PGJ-B67W] [hereinafter 
2011 ANNUAL REPORT] (overestimating revenues). 
 71. GARY, supra note 2, at 45. When a government lacks absorptive capacity, it often 
means that a government lacks enough economically viable projects to fund, or it lacks the 
staffing (both in quantity and quality) adequate to manage such a project. ROMEO A. REYES, 
ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY FOR FOREIGN AID 35–36 (1990), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PNABE619.pdf [http://perma.cc/P9ZQ-9W4T]. Even if the government might be physically 
capable of spending its money, absorptive capacity includes an assessment of the government’s 
ability to oversee such an expenditure so that the funds are not wasted or siphoned off through 
graft. See id. at 37–38 (“To ensure financial accountability in the use of foreign aid, the auditing 
office would need to regulate its use by prescribing certain accounting and auditing rules and 
regulations.”). 
 72. See GARY, supra note 2, at 45 (“[I]t would appear that significant sums would have to 
be put into an oil savings or stabilization fund to avoid absorptive capacity problems.”). 
 73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. If a government is unable to absorb money 
into its budget, it effectively means that the government does not have the ability to spend or 
invest it, which prevents its citizens from realizing any immediate benefit from it. Cf. GARY, 
supra note 2, at 45 (noting that Gabon, a longtime producer, has high spending on social 
services in comparison with other African countries). 
 74. See Sony Kapoor, Investing for the Future: Good for Norway – Good for Development 
20 (Nor. Church Aid, Discussion Paper 01, 2013), http://www.re-define.org/sites/default/files/
sites/default/files/images/ReDefineReportonNorwaySWF.pdf [http://perma.cc/M74R-3RYD] 
(providing that sovereign-wealth funds need to generate sustainable returns at or above the 
level budgeted by the government). 
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and has proved problematic for Ghana so far. The Ghanaian 
government has had serious trouble accurately projecting its 
petroleum revenues, which prevents optimal utilization of those 
funds. The projections’ best showing was in 2012, but this was still off 
by GHS 250 million (approximately US$78 million) of the actual 
amount of petroleum revenues, which resulted in an approximately 15 
percent shortfall for the ABFA.75 Figure 1 below demonstrates the 
historical difficulty the Ghanaian government has had in projecting its 
petroleum revenues over the first four years of production by 
comparing projected and actual petroleum revenues. The PIAC has 
consistently criticized the government in its annual reports for failing 
to accurately and transparently project the Benchmark Revenue.76 
With the continuing extreme volatility in oil prices baffling budget 
projectors across the globe,77 the Ghanaian government—as any 
government would—will likely continue to struggle to project its 
budget accurately. Indeed, when projecting its revenue for 2015, the 
government assumed a crude oil price of approximately US$99 per 
barrel.78 Prices have since been in free fall: the price of crude sat 
around US$48 per barrel on September 11, 2015, and Goldman Sachs 
predicts that it could drop as low as US$20 per barrel in the near 
future.79 Although the Ghanaian Minister of Finance has taken the 
commendable step of revising the budget projections down since his 
 
 75. See 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 23 (underestimating petroleum revenues 
by approximately GHS 453 million); 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 13, 16 
(overestimating petroleum revenues by approximately GHS 260 million, resulting in a roughly 
GHS 100 million shortfall of the GHS 614 million ABFA); 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
70, at 11 (overestimating petroleum revenues by approximately GHS 583 million). 
 76. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 32; 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 
xiii; 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at vi; 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at viii. 
 77. See Isabella Cota, Eric Martin & Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, Mexico Dodged Oil-Price 
Rout After Big Banks Provided Hedges, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 11, 2015, 2:39 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-11/mexico-beat-oil-price-rout-as-bankers-
took-other-side-of-hedge [http://perma.cc/85R3-72TB] (describing how Mexico, a petroleum-
revenue-dependent state, used derivative contracts to avoid some of the crash in oil prices 
affecting government revenue); Chris Giles, Oil Rout Would Have Wrecked an Independent 
Scotland’s Finances, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d97d49ce-877d-
11e4-bc7c-00144feabdc0.html [http://perma.cc/QV35-KZWP] (noting that the uncertainty and 
volatility in oil prices makes it incredibly difficult to project government oil revenues, and this 
difficulty imposes significant risks on economies like Scotland that rely heavily on oil revenues). 
 78. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 55. 
 79. Oil Prices “Could Sink to Near $20,” Warns Goldman, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), 
http://www.ft.com/fastft/390471/oil-prices-could-sink-near-20-warns-goldman [https://perma.cc/
8PD5-T4PB]. 
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initial projections,80 this nevertheless highlights the struggle that any 
government faces when trying to forecast commodities revenues. The 
notoriously perilous process of projecting oil revenues makes it 
difficult for Ghana to manage this income stream in an optimally 
efficient manner, which, coupled with a lack of transparency, suggests 
that Ghana may have problems combating the resource curse.81 These 
difficulties unfortunately hint at the very struggle that often 
characterizes the resource curse: managing and investing natural-
resource rents.82 
 
Figure 1. Projected v. Actual Ghanaian Petroleum Revenue83 
Although it may seem that the current regime at least hedged the 
risk that it might not be able to efficiently spend and invest its budget 
through the use of the petroleum funds, those funds have not 
generated steady returns.84 The returns are so low, in fact, that it will 
be virtually impossible for them sustain future generations without 
 
 80. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 56. 
 81. Governments in resource-rich countries need to have a very effective revenue-
projection system, not only in order to efficiently allocate resources, but also to avoid an all-out 
breakdown in fiscal responsibility. GARY, supra note 2, at 11 (“With booms often comes 
dramatically increased, and unsustainable, public spending based on unrealistic revenue 
projections.”). 
 82. See supra notes 27, 29 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra note 70. 
 84. See infra Figures 2–3. 
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drawing down the principal, which, naturally, defeats the funds’ long-
term viability. As Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, although the book 
value of both funds has been growing at a frantic rate, on average 
more than 99 percent of this growth has been from contributions of 
new oil revenue and less than 1 percent from return on investment. 
With a nominal annualized rate of return of only 1 percent in 2014,85 
the Ghanaian funds likely rank among the worst performing 
sovereign-wealth funds in the world. Norway’s fund was recently 
criticized for bringing in a nominal annualized rate of return of 5.25 
percent.86 Successful funds have generated significantly higher 
annualized rates of return than Ghana’s: Abu Dhabi’s fund has 
returned 7.7 percent, China’s 5.02 percent, and one of Singapore’s 4 
percent.87 As the PIAC has noted,88 Ghana’s petroleum funds are not 
earning sufficient returns to provide a viable source of income for 
future generations. Ghana’s existing system for managing petroleum 
revenue does not fit the nation’s need for sustainable development 
and poverty reduction, as it makes it difficult both to project revenue 
for purposes of efficient spending and to earn meaningful returns on 
its fund investments. 
  
 
 85. See infra Figures 2–3.  
 86. Kapoor, supra note 74, at 29. 
 87. Id. at 35. This is the Singapore Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund, which is among the 
more conservatively managed funds and still manages to greatly outpace the Ghanaian fund. Id. 
 88. See 2013 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that, because a lack of high 
returns has caused concern, “[t]he Government must release the Policy and Guidelines to assist 
the Fund Managers to better manage these funds as required by the [Petroleum of Revenue 
Management Act of 2011]”); Press Release, Pub. Interest and Accountability Comm., Statement 
by the Public Interest & Accountability Committee (PIAC) on the Current Debate on the 
Ghana Heritage Fund, at 2 (May 7, 2014), http://www.piacghana.org/pstatement.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3MPC-GWWD] [hereinafter PIAC May 2014 Press Release] (arguing that the 
Heritage Fund should invest in “low-interest earning but safe investments for the long-term 
instead of high-yielding, gilt-edged securities which invariably are volatile”). Although 
protecting principal is undoubtedly important, the Heritage Fund cannot ignore yields 
altogether if it wishes to achieve sustainable status. The fund must at least outpace inflation to 
an extent that allows Ghanaians the ability to eventually withdraw from the fund without 
depleting its principal balance. 
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Figure 3. Ghana Heritage Fund (US$)90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 89. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 50; 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 
48; 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 22–23; 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 
29. Note that the decline in book value of the Stabilization Fund is due to government 
withdrawals during 2014. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; infra notes 91–93 and 
accompanying text. 
 90. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 50; 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 
48; 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 23; 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 29. 
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2. Fund Protection.  In addition to engendering economic 
inefficiencies, the current system of allocating petroleum revenues 
between the government budget and the petroleum funds poses 
problems of political economy indicative of the resource curse. 
Consistent with Ghana’s historical tendencies toward overspending 
and pork-barrel politics, it appears that the petroleum funds are 
tempting politicians who are hungry to access the hundreds of 
millions of dollars locked within them. For example, four years into 
the Heritage Fund’s existence the General Secretary of the ruling 
NDC party, Johnson Nketia, has already proposed drawing it down91 
notwithstanding the fact that the law creating it specifically allows for 
the government to access the funds only “[w]ithin one year after 
petroleum reserves are depleted.”92 It appears that some Ghanaian 
politicians want to flout the avowed object of the Heritage Fund: to 
“provide an endowment to support the development for future 
generations when the petroleum reserves have been depleted.”93 
Though the PIAC has publically condemned proposals to 
prematurely deplete the funds,94 the risk of such depletion remains a 
source of concern given the possibility of the resource curse and 
symptoms like the voracity effect.95 
Despite the PIAC’s protests, parts of the Ghanaian government 
have already demonstrated a willingness to undermine the long-term 
viability of the fund system. In May 2014, the Minister of Finance 
blatantly violated the PRMA by retroactively capping the 
Stabilization Fund at US$250 million and withdrawing the excess of 
approximately US$176 million.96 Of that money, US$16 million was 
placed in a “Contingency Fund” and the remaining US$159 million 
 
 91. Asiedu Nketia: Heritage Fund Makes No Sense, Let’s ‘Chop’ It Now!, 
EXPOSEGHANA.COM (May 2, 2014), http://exposeghana.com/2014/05/asiedu-nketia-heritage-
fund-makes-no-sense-lets-chop-it-now [http://perma.cc/92GB-4EZM]; see also PIAC May 2014 
Press Release, supra note 88, at 1 (rejecting such a proposal as contrary to Sections 13 and 20 of 
the Petroleum Revenue Management Act). 
 92. Petroleum Revenue Management Act § 2(1) (Act No. 815/2011) (Ghana), http://www.
 mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/Petroleum_Revenue_Management_Act_%202011.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/737A-Y7J4]. 
 93. Id. § 10(2)(a). 
 94. PIAC May 2014 Press Release, supra note 88, at 1. 
 95. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 96. Press Release, Pub. Interest & Accountability Comm., Position of the Public Interest 
and Accountability Committee (PIAC) on Placement of Cap by the Minister of Finance on the 
Ghana Stabilisation Fund (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.piacghana.org/PressStatementII.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/M6Z8-9BWY]. 
SIMPSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/2016  8:19 AM 
2016] THE IDEAL OF THE CITIZEN-SHAREHOLDER 1299 
was used to repay some of Ghana’s debts.97 The law does grant the 
Minister of Finance the authority to cap the Stabilization Fund, but 
the statute’s text does not suggest that such authority applies 
retroactively.98 Moreover, although the Minister might have 
prospectively kept excess petroleum revenues from being deposited 
into the Stabilization Fund, once money is actually in the Fund it may 
only be transferred out “for the purpose of alleviating shortfalls in 
actual petroleum revenue.”99 Thus, Ghana’s petroleum funds might 
seem like mechanisms for protecting some of the Ghanaian people’s 
oil wealth from the reach of the government in order to avoid the 
corruption, mismanagement, and abuse of power that erode 
democracy in resource-cursed countries, but the funds’ legal 
framework does not adequately alleviate these concerns. Examples 
like these indicate a lack of fiscal discipline, which could enable 
corrupt behavior. Indeed, some politicians may “see these funds as a 
panacea or substitute for strong public financial management systems 
and policy frameworks.”100 
Concerns about fiscal discipline also extend to the ABFA. To the 
government’s credit, the PIAC provides a significant amount of 
transparency in how the ABFA is allocated in the budget.101 However, 
transparency as to what sector of the government or what projects the 
money is going to does not necessarily reduce the risk of corruption, 
and the benefits of transparency are undermined by a lack of properly 
incentivized oversight. For example, “[t]he Serious Fraud Office has 
been underutilized and under-resourced and currently needs the 
approval of the attorney general to approve investigative cases.”102 
The Nigerian example shows that lack of strict oversight can lead to 
corruption of state officials, especially those involved in the 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. The relevant portion of the law reads, “The accumulated resources of the Ghana 
Stabilisation Fund shall not exceed an amount recommended by the Minister and approved by 
Parliament . . . .” Petroleum Revenue Management Act § 23(3) (Act No. 815/2011) (Ghana), 
http://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/Petroleum_Revenue_Management_Act_%2
02011.pdf [http://perma.cc/2RQS-448J].  
 99. Id. § 12(5). 
 100. See GARY, supra note 2, at 46 (describing attitudes of governments around the world 
toward natural-resource funds, including budget-stabilization funds).  
 101. See 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 28–36 (providing data detailing the 
allocation and utilization of ABFA funds); 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 18–20 
(same); 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 21–26 (same). 
 102. GARY, supra note 2, at 46. 
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petroleum industry itself.103 Ghana would thus likely benefit greatly 
from a regime that incentivizes oversight. 
3. Enclave Economies.  The current petroleum revenue-
management regime does not adequately address the resource curse’s 
macroeconomic roots. Politicians are free to spend the ABFA 
however they like and are not committed to reducing the risk of 
developing an enclave oil economy, nor do they have the incentives to 
do so. From 2011 to 2013, the government allocated 10 percent of the 
ABFA to building petroleum production capacity, 20 percent to 
expenditures and amortization of the loans it took out to finance 
petroleum production, and 63 percent to roads and other 
infrastructure,104 much of which went to energy infrastructure,105 and 
much of which presumably went to the petroleum industry in some 
form or another.106 Although it certainly makes sense that the 
petroleum industry will require extra capital as production ramps up, 
it should not come at the expense of spreading government money 
around to encourage growth in different sectors of the economy and 
to prevent the development of an enclave petroleum economy. The 
risks of an enclave economy are especially pronounced in Ghana, 
where an economy already over-reliant on commodity exports like 
gold and cocoa subjects the country to price fluctuations in the world 
market and makes it difficult to plan for development.107 The problem 
is that government officials lack incentives to redirect ABFA money 
to other sectors of the economy. It makes logical sense for a 
politician, who is presumably not going to be in office much longer 
than the twenty- to thirty-year production window, to focus entirely 
on building up Ghana’s capacity to make short-term gains. Doing so 
would maximize the amount of money she can put to use while she is 
still in office. Such concerns about incentives are well founded, as 
current policy appears to favor just such short-term gains.108 
 
 103. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 104. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 29. 
 105. Id. at 32–35.  
 106. Although it is difficult to track the dollars down with any degree of scientific exactitude 
through the publically available reports, it seems quite logical that much of the infrastructural 
investments would be to facilitate petroleum production, such as the provision of electricity, 
which is necessary for many elements of the productions process.  
 107. GARY, supra note 2, at 2. 
 108. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
SIMPSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/2016  8:19 AM 
2016] THE IDEAL OF THE CITIZEN-SHAREHOLDER 1301 
In fact, the legal regime that Ghana has adopted to manage its 
petroleum revenues carries too many perverse incentives that 
encourage the sort of behavior characteristic of the resource curse. 
Though it serves a legitimate purpose by insulating the government 
budget from price fluctuations in the global oil market, the 
Stabilization Fund reduces incentives to manage the budget 
responsibly. After all, this safety net, which apparently can be drawn 
down by the Minister of Finance whenever he wishes,109 insulates 
politicians from immediate budget constraints that might otherwise 
prompt prudence. This problem is compounded by the fact that the 
government can obtain loans by collateralizing future oil 
production.110 Furthermore, despite claims that it will not happen,111 
politicians have a strong incentive to spend ABFA money on 
patronage systems in order to maintain power, which is particularly 
troubling given the nation’s tendencies toward pork-barrel politics. 
All of this foreshadows behavior indicative of the resource curse.112 
It should be emphasized, however, that Ghana still has a strong, 
young democratic tradition, which helps to combat the resource 
curse.113 Ghana has undertaken to provide transparency in the 
industry—that much of the data used in this Part was sourced from 
publicly available government reports speaks to the success of such 
transparency efforts,114 as does the statutory declaration of 
transparency as a fundamental principle of petroleum-revenue 
management.115 However, as alluded to above, the persistent difficulty 
is that the present legal regime does not adequately incentivize open 
and accountable governance going forward. As is common in 
 
 109. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (discussing proposed withdrawals from 
the Heritage Fund). 
 110. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 592. 
 111. Id. at 587–88. 
 112. See Gyampo, supra note 1, at 7 (“[W]hoever won the election was going to have an 
‘ATM machine on his veranda . . . .’” (citation omitted)).  
 113. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
 114. However, this data is largely limited to financial reports and excludes operational 
information that is of great public importance, such as environmental impact reports, 
information about how the petroleum is marketed (to ensure Ghana is receiving top dollar), or 
how the assumed oil price is calculated for budgetary purposes. See generally 2013 ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 11 (reporting primarily on the budgeting and allocation of petroleum 
funds); 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69 (same); 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70 
(same). 
 115. Petroleum Revenue Management Act § 49 (Act 815/2011) (Ghana), http://www.
mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/Petroleum_Revenue_Management_Act_%202011.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2RQS-448J].  
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resource-cursed countries, when extractive industries pay into the 
government, wealth and power are increasingly concentrated in the 
government’s hands.116 In a nation like Ghana whose democratic 
strength is due largely to its network of civil-society organizations,117 
high levels of transparency are needed to allow these organizations to 
effectively check the government and counteract a concentration of 
power and wealth.118 Although part of this can be remedied by making 
additional disclosures—such as of the signed contracts with private 
companies like Kosmos, Tullow, or Anadarko119—this does not 
remedy the structural problem of incentives. Providing optimal levels 
of transparency is neither convenient nor desirable for Ghanaian 
leaders under the current system. 
Indeed, perverse incentives are already eroding transparency. 
For example, the Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
was created to encourage transparency in the sector but actually 
provides little meaningful information and accountability.120 
Moreover, it is “difficult for citizens to hold government accountable 
for its management of the public’s money” and “[o]pportunities for 
citizen participation in budget debates could be increased.”121 Input of 
civil-society organizations has also been largely circumscribed on 
matters of policy,122 and the Ghanaian government already has a poor 
track record of allowing such organizations access to information,123 
which does not bode well for Ghanaian democracy.124 Thus, Ghana’s 
misaligned incentives cast considerable doubt on the democratic 
efficacy of its legal regime for managing its petroleum resources and 
facilitate the undisciplined, pork-barrel spending that may stop 
 
 116. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 591 (highlighting the role of civil-service 
organizations in creating oil policies).  
 118. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 12, at 122 (“[T]he absence of political transparency and 
accountability, coupled with the high incidence of corruption, have all combined to undermine 
the ability of the various levels of government in a country like Nigeria from putting in place 
policies and programmes that would contribute to the overall socio-economic development of 
the oil producing areas.”).  
 119. GARY, supra note 2, at 30–31. 
 120. See id. at 15 (noting some of the Initiative’s weaknesses, including its voluntary nature 
and that it does not cover disclosure of contracts). 
 121. Id. at 45. 
 122. Gyampo, supra note 1, at 6. 
 123. GARY, supra note 2, at 48. 
 124. See Gyampo, supra note 1, at 7 (noting a threat to Ghanaian democracy from this 
trend). 
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Ghana from addressing the macroeconomic roots of the resource 
curse. 
The current legal regime that Ghana has adopted for managing 
its petroleum revenues simply does not do enough to alleviate the 
risks of the resource curse. The structure of the Ghanaian regime 
facilitates rather than frustrates the macroeconomic and political 
economy roots of the resource curse. The Ghanaian system suffers 
from three main problems: (1) it fails to provide for sufficient 
economic development and poverty relief, (2) it does not adequately 
incentivize or facilitate strict oversight and control of the powers 
responsible for management of petroleum revenue, and (3) it does 
not provide an appropriate channel for passing the economic benefits 
of petroleum extraction to the rest of the economy. Though there are 
signs of hope in the Ghanaian system given its growing democratic 
strength, much of the problem is attributable to the government’s 
attempt to institute a type of system that, although similar to systems 
effective in Norway and countries with similar levels of democratic 
accountability, is not feasible in Ghana. A strategy for preempting the 
resource curse in Ghana must take account of the country’s 
limitations and strengths and focus on aligning incentives with good 
governance and social benefit from petroleum extraction. 
II.  ALTERNATIVE LEGAL REGIMES 
Given that the current Ghanaian legal regime for managing 
petroleum wealth is insufficient to protect against the resource curse, 
this Part examines and compares systems from Alaska, Norway, 
Indonesia, and Trinidad and Tobago, which Ghana might consider 
implementing. None of these systems can be transplanted in its 
entirety to Ghana, as a solution must be tailored to the nation’s 
political and socioeconomic realities. But the comparison nonetheless 
helps illuminate certain principles that a Ghanaian legal regime 
should embrace in order to defeat the resource curse: (1) the regime 
should include a constituency with the means and incentives to 
oversee and to keep in check whatever institution is empowered to 
manage petroleum revenues, and (2) it should also entail a high level 
of transparency to allow that constituency to effectively oversee and 
restrain the managerial institution. 
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A. Alaska 
Beginning in 1967, the state of Alaska discovered substantial oil 
reserves beneath state-owned land, which gave rise to hefty rents for 
the government.125 The Alaska legislature “decided that a portion of 
income from oil reserves and other natural resources should be 
invested to maximize long-term revenue from the state’s natural 
resources, and in 1976 the Alaska Constitution was amended to 
establish the Alaska Permanent Fund.”126 The constitutional 
amendment requires that at least 25 percent of all state revenues from 
mineral extraction be invested in the Alaskan Permanent Fund 
(APF).127 The APF is then managed by a state-owned corporation, the 
Alaskan Permanent Fund Corporation.128 The Corporation must 
make income-producing investments according to the “prudent-
investor rule,” which requires it to use the care of an ordinarily 
prudent institutional investor.129 This rule is especially important to 
the Alaskan legal regime because, since 1980, qualified Alaskan 
residents have been entitled to receive dividends from the fund.130 In 
2014, Alaskans received a dividend of US$1,884.131 The amounts have 
fluctuated, but the dividend has not fallen below US$800 since 1988.132 
The APF, especially the dividend program, appears to have been 
remarkably successful at combating the resource curse because it 
reduces the concentration of oil wealth in the hands of the state and 
gives Alaskans an incentive to ensure proper management of the 
Fund.133 Indeed, one of the motivating factors for enacting the 
dividend program in the first place was the common perception that 
politicians had wasted large amounts of oil revenue.134 The Alaskan 
government’s mismanagement was facilitated by a lack of serious 
 
 125. Harrod v. Alaska Dep’t of Revenue, 255 P.3d 991, 994 (Alaska 2011). 
 126. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 127. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15. 
 128. About the Fund, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., http://www.apfc.org/home/
Content/aboutFund/aboutPermFund.cfm [http://perma.cc/6S8S-F6MX]. 
 129. ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.120 (2012). 
 130. Harrod, 255 P.3d at 994. 
 131. Annual Dividend Payouts, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., http://www.apfc.org/
home/Content/dividend/dividendamounts.cfm [http://perma.cc/76WM-BXG7]. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Moss & Young, supra note 12, at 9 (noting that with the dividends, Alaska 
artificially created an empowered constituency interested in “responsible resource 
management”). 
 134. Id. 
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political accountability for its use of oil revenues.135 The dividend 
program solved this problem by “creating a political constituency for 
the Permanent Fund that did not previously exist.”136 In fact, some 
scholars have argued that receipt of Permanent Fund Dividends is 
premised on membership in the Alaskan political community.137 The 
Alaskan system of oil-revenue management has been so successful 
that commentators have suggested that Ghana adopt a modified 
version of it through direct cash distribution of petroleum revenues, 
which would result in a payout of approximately US$50 per capita per 
annum.138 
Although the proposition of a population-wide revenue-sharing 
scheme in Ghana is a potentially attractive solution to the resource 
curse (as will be addressed later),139 it is not altogether clear that an 
Alaskan-style system will fit the Ghanaian context given the lack of a 
highly developed, longstanding democratic infrastructure. Of course, 
Ghana has made wonderful progress in developing democratic 
institutions;140 it would be naive, however, to expect nascent 
institutions to respond positively to large influxes of cash. In Alaska, 
simply providing dividends was enough to establish a constituency 
with a vested interest in exacting proper management from a 
government that was a part of one of the world’s most stable 
democracies.141 The reform was thus operating from a much higher 
accountability and rule-of-law baseline than exists in Ghana. Indeed, 
even if the proposal were passed notwithstanding the retrenched 
interests of political factions seeking to retain a hold on oil wealth,142 
the example of the PIAC suggests that government administration of 
such a program would be significantly hampered by institutional 
weaknesses.143 Simply put, Ghanaian citizens are unlikely to exact 
sufficient accountability from an Alaskan-style fund managed 
 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. See Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend and Membership 
in the State’s Political Community, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 79, 81 (2012) (arguing that dividend 
receipt is related to membership in the state’s political community). 
 138. Moss & Young, supra note 12, at 13–16. 
 139. See infra Part III. 
 140. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Norman, supra note 32, at 176 (listing the United States among stable 
democracies). 
 142. Moss & Young, supra note 12, at 18. 
 143. See supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text. 
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through their elected representatives.144 As such, a direct-distribution 
system based on the Alaskan model would not likely be of significant 
aid in helping Ghana to avoid the resource curse. 
B. Norway 
When Norway discovered large offshore oil reserves in the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
government established a national petroleum company, Statoil, to 
develop the nation’s offshore reserves.145 Since 1985, Statoil has 
shared custodianship of the state’s large participating equity interest 
in petroleum ventures with the State’s Direct Financial Interest, a 
government entity.146 In addition, the Norwegian government 
established a separate regulatory authority, the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directory, which was seen as crucial to avoid confounding the state’s 
commercial and regulatory interests.147 In 2001, the government gave 
up part of its stake in Statoil when the company went public, but it 
still maintains large participating interests in the oil reserves and the 
company.148 
All the government’s oil revenues are deposited in the 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund, the nation’s massive 
sovereign-wealth fund, which is insulated from political interference 
and managed by independent government financial institutions such 
as the central bank.149 Though the Norwegian government is allowed 
to set the Fund’s investment policy,150 the Fund is structurally 
insulated by a ban on collateralizing oil revenues to increase 
government borrowing capacity151 and by a requirement that the Fund 
 
 144. See supra notes 91–103 and accompanying text. 
 145. Mike Olsen, Note, The Future of National Oil Companies in Russia & How They May 
Improve Their Global Competitiveness, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 617, 634–35 (2013) (“Norway 
eventually chose [to create a state-owned company to represent its interests in petroleum] 
largely due to the fear that a private company would be in control of the nation’s resources and 
its interests would primarily promote international capital.”).  
 146. Id. at 637. 
 147. Id. at 636. 
 148. Id. at 639–41. 
 149. See NOR. MINISTRY OF FIN., THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT PENSION 
FUND IN 2013, at 6 (2014), https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/5434cb3d2ff04441
a21a2c9b1d55ea06/en-gb/pdfs/stm201320140019000engpdfs.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4VN-64ZQ] 
(outlining the basic goals, structure, and strategy of the fund). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 592. 
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cannot have any pension liabilities associated with it.152 Instead, the 
government is allowed to budget for an average annualized real 
return of 4 percent to be spent as it will in order to share the benefits 
of oil production with future generations.153 Though it has had some 
hiccups along the way,154 the fund is now earning huge returns and is 
the world’s largest sovereign-wealth fund with holdings of US$820 
billion.155 
The Norwegian centralized-fund system for managing oil 
revenues has been remarkably successful, due primarily to the 
Norwegian government’s overwhelming sense of public 
accountability. It provides an unparalleled level of transparency in the 
investment and use of its oil revenues and invests with a focus on 
social policy both in Norway and abroad, which has made the Fund 
the envy of the world and the enemy of the resource curse.156 Indeed, 
political commitment to the notion of the fund as a communal 
resource for the good of the nation is reinforced by the nation’s 
extensive managerial capacity, contributing to an environment of 
stability, growth, and prosperity—the antithesis of the resource curse: 
“The high level of transparency in political and bureaucratic 
processes reinforces the general trust in the integrity of politicians as 
well as in the professional skills of the civil service—few Norwegians 
would question the government’s ability to manage Norway’s oil rents 
in an honest and efficient way.”157 
Indeed, in a speech to stakeholders in Ghanaian petroleum, the 
Norwegian Minister of Environment, Erik Solheim, made it 
abundantly clear that his country’s oil revenue-management regime is 
driven by such a spirit of accountability: “Our philosophy in Norway 
 
 152. About the Fund, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/about-
the-fund [http://perma.cc/CP2G-EL8M] (last updated Aug. 21, 2014).  
 153. Kapoor, supra note 74, at 25. 
 154. See id. at 33 (criticizing Norway’s fund management for failing to produce a real rate of 
return above 4 percent before 2013); Alan Cowell, Is Norway’s Oil Pool Deep Enough? Aging 
Baby Boomers Loom Over a Fund Financed by Petroleum, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at C1, C3 
(describing political pushes to draw down the principal of the fund to finance various endeavors 
such as entrepreneurship or infrastructure and education investment). 
 155. Stanley Reed, Rise in Stocks Leads to surge in Norway’s Oil Fund Profit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 1, 2014, at B6. 
 156. See, e.g., Benn Eifert, Alan Gelb & Nils Borje Tallroth, Managing Oil Wealth, 40 FIN. & 
DEV. 40, 43 (2003) (arguing that Norway’s Fund’s transparency and social awareness make it the 
gold standard for sovereign-wealth funds); Delia Velculescu, Norway’s Oil Fund Shows the Way 
for Wealth Funds, IMF SURV. MAG. (July 9, 2008), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
survey/so/2008/POL070908A.htm [http://perma.cc/MAR6-WWS3] (same).  
 157. Eifert et al., supra note 156, at 43. 
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is that the oil revenue belongs to the people of Norway. No one 
else.”158 Given this egalitarian and clearly successful model, it is no 
wonder that Ghana has actively sought to model its legal regime for 
management of oil revenues on that of Norway.159 
Although Ghanaian officials agree with Solheim’s egalitarian 
notion that “the oil revenue of Ghana belongs pure and simple to the 
people of Ghana,”160 Ghana lacks the institutional capacity to 
implement such an ideal by means of the Norwegian model. As 
discussed at length in Part I, the Ghanaian attempt at instituting a 
Norwegian-style legal regime for managing oil revenues is foundering 
and has placed Ghana at risk of succumbing to the resource curse. 
The Ghanaian government has not placed sufficient trust in the 
Norwegian notion that radical transparency,161 strict adherence to the 
letter of the law,162 and full democratic accountability in the 
management of oil revenues culminate to promote a stable and 
sustainable oil economy.163 Indeed, the Ghanaian government was 
unable to resist the urge to collateralize its petroleum proceeds,164 
with the resulting debt creating a threat of funds being used to 
mitigate increased budget deficits. Nor has the Bank of Ghana been 
able to catalyze the returns needed to make its funds sustainable.165 
Therefore, though Ghana can learn a great deal about ideals for 
governing petroleum revenues from Norway, an outright Norwegian 
system is simply not feasible for Ghana. 
C. Indonesia 
Unlike Alaska and Norway, Indonesia has been producing oil for 
well over one hundred years under Dutch, Japanese, and, as of 
independence in 1949, home rule.166 Given the colonial context, 
Indonesia did not have the opportunity to develop any sort of legal 
 
 158. BIG MEN, supra note 16. 
 159. Gyampo, supra note 1, at 8. As will be addressed infra Part II.D, Ghana has also drawn 
inspiration from Trinidad and Tobago. 
 160. BIG MEN, supra note 16. 
 161. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 109–24 and accompanying text. 
 164. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 592. 
 165. See supra Figures 1–3; see also supra notes 70–82 and accompanying text (describing 
the Ghanaian government’s struggle to accurately predict revenues and to create returns on its 
petroleum-fund investments). 
 166. Shannon Pallone, Indonesia’s Oil Crisis: How Indonesia Became a Net Oil Importer, 10 
J. INT’L POL. SOLUTIONS 1, 2 (2009). 
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regime for petroleum-revenue management until more than sixty 
years after reserves were discovered.167 The government began by 
carrying a simple 50-percent participating equity interest in the 
reserves developed by private companies, but, in 1968, the 
government formed a national oil company, Pertamina, which has 
since dominated the Indonesian oil market and brought in substantial 
revenues.168 With Pertamina in control of the oil industry and with 
virtually no transparency, Indonesian officials, by means of the 
nation’s oil revenues, developed an extensive patronage system with 
alarming levels of corruption throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century.169 The corruption subsumed what commentators 
have referred to as the policies of a “reformist autocracy,” in which 
oil revenues were earlier spent to bring about measurable social 
gain.170 The Indonesian technocrats ran the economy and used oil 
revenues to stabilize the food supply, reform the financial sector, 
invest in economic infrastructure, and diversify the economy, 
particularly through agriculture.171 Indonesia has since stepped up its 
corruption investigation and enforcement in an effort to realize the 
substantial technocratic expertise that initially allowed the nation to 
flourish.172 
Indonesia has also undertaken serious structural reforms of its oil 
revenue-management regime to improve its allocation of those 
revenues to their most beneficial uses. Beginning in the 1990s, 
Indonesia began implementing a large-scale natural resource 
revenue-sharing plan among the various levels of government and 
geographic regions, giving proportionately higher allocations to 
petroleum producing areas.173 This de jure asymmetric program is 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 2–3. 
 170. Eifert et al., supra note 156, at 43. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Pallone, supra note 166, at 4. 
 173. Cut Dian Agustina, Ehtisham Ahmad, Dhanie Nugroho & Herbert Siagian, Political 
Economy of Natural Resource Sharing in Indonesia 2 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci., 
Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 55, 2012), http://www.lse.ac.uk/asiaresearchcentre/
_files/arcwp55-agustinaahmadnugrohosiagian.pdf [http://perma.cc/37UR-NG5Q]. The levels of 
government are central, provincial, and district (local). Id. at 5. The central government still 
receives the lion’s share of natural-resource revenues; however, the decentralizing program has 
given a substantial amount to the district governments as well. Id. At a geographic level, oil-
producing regions receive 40 percent of all subnationally allocated oil revenues in proportion to 
their production levels, and another 40 percent is divided pro rata among all of the 
nonproducing regions. Id. at 14.  
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designed to combat the resource curse in two substantial ways. The 
first is reducing the risk of inter-regional conflict (and, hence, 
increasing political and economic stability) in a geographically and 
ethnically diverse nation by allowing different regions to see more of 
their perceived fair share of revenues generated through extraction 
on their land.174 The second is that the revenue sharing increases 
government accountability by giving all constituents an incentive to 
ensure that the revenues are used most efficiently175 and are tailored 
to the needs of specific communities via the local governments.176 It is 
precisely the close relationship between the citizenry and their local 
governments that should boost awareness of and interest in the use of 
oil revenues.177 
Although it remains too early to fully calculate the efficacy of 
Indonesia oil revenue-management reforms, especially in regard to 
efforts to combat corruption,178 the structural reforms at least initially 
appear to be performing well. The district-level allocation system 
seems to be reducing inter-regional tensions,179 and the accountability 
function seems to be doing well at least on a macro level.180 However, 
as regards individual officials, accountability does not appear to have 
as much traction as the country is still mired in corruption.181 Of 
course, patronage networks will take time to be dismantled given 
their long-standing status in Indonesia, so there may yet be hope that 
corruption will be eradicated, and an already-strong Indonesian 
economy will be able to truly soar and live up to its vast potential.182 
 
 174. See id. at 6–7 (arguing that the asymmetric plan was instituted in direct response to calls 
for secession over the central government’s perceived theft of regional resources).  
 175. See id. at 33 (discussing how increasing oil-revenue expenditure at the local level 
facilitates accountability for the use of oil revenues by local officials). Presumably, this logic 
extends up the chain of government as well. Just as it gives the citizenry an incentive to monitor 
local officials, so too would it provide an incentive for citizens to monitor revenue allocations 
made by the central government. Incentives for monitoring up the chain would also likely 
extend to the different levels of government, providing checks and balances to manage oil 
revenues. 
 176. Id. at 29–30. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Pallone, supra note 166, at 4 (discussing the difficulties faced by increased efforts at 
combating corruption). 
 179. Agustina et al., supra note 173, at 6. 
 180. See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 13, at 102 (ranking Indonesia highly in 
constraints of government and government transparency). 
 181. See id. (ranking Indonesia in the bottom quartile for corruption). 
 182. See THE WORLD BANK, INDONESIA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY: SLOWER GROWTH; 
HIGH RISKS, at i–iv (Dec. 2013), http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/
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Given the strong technocratic base in Indonesia, that seems a real 
possibility.183 
Although the Indonesian model—at least theoretically—has 
potential to provide a low-cost system for implementing structural 
protections from the resource curse, it will likely not be feasible or 
even desirable in Ghana. The Indonesian system addresses problems 
that Ghana does not have given the lack of local political 
infrastructure and of much inter-regional conflict. As a matter of fact, 
Ghana is a completely centralized state with no regional 
governments.184 Indeed, regional185 and local government is simply 
administered by agents of the central government at the pleasure of 
the Ghanaian president.186 Thus, Ghana fundamentally lacks the sort 
of popular local and intergovernmental accountability that makes the 
Indonesian system attractive as a method of combating the resource 
curse. Such intergovernmental accountability could not realistically 
be implemented without a wholesale constitutional restructuring of 
the Ghanaian government. Moreover, a large part of what makes the 
Indonesian model a potentially effective means of combatting the 
resource curse is its ability to minimize inter-regional conflict—a 
manifest symptom of the resource curse in Indonesia which is not 
present in Ghana and that thus makes the Indonesian solution less 
relevant. Therefore, like the Alaskan and Norwegian models, the 
Indonesian model is not likely to offer much guidance to Ghana as it 
seeks to fight off the resource curse. 
D. Trinidad and Tobago 
Trinidad and Tobago was allegedly, in 1857, the site of the 
world’s first productive oil well while under British colonial rule; 
unlike Indonesia, however, petroleum production did not become a 
 
EAP/Indonesia/IEQ-Dec13-ENGLISH.pdf [http://perma.cc/2RA8-ETN3] (arguing that 
Indonesia should adopt policies to retain its high level of economic growth in order to reach its 
potential as a powerhouse economy in Southeast Asia). 
 183. Eifert et al., supra note 156, at 43 (describing Indonesia’s history of leveraging 
bureaucratic expertise to spend oil revenue efficiently and effectively). 
 184. See Victor Essien, UPDATE: Researching Ghanaian Law, GLOBALEX (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Ghana1.htm [http://perma.cc/JFL2-X5KD] (discussing 
Ghana’s general legal framework). 
 185. FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG GHANA, THE STRUCTURE OF THE GHANAIAN STATE 6 
(2011), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ghana/10504.pdf [http://perma.cc/MB7H-YTXW]. 
 186. See id. at 8–9. 
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major part of its economy until its independence in the 1960s.187 
Independence put the country in much greater control of its 
petroleum resources, and, hence, its petroleum revenue, which 
amounted to half of all government revenues as of 2008.188 The 
country uses multiple state-owned corporations, partnered with 
private investors, to develop its petroleum resources and to bring in 
the government’s nontax revenue.189 The Trinidadian government has 
long had a policy of plowing its petroleum revenues back into the 
economy, primarily to fuel additional exploration, production, and 
expansion of natural-gas exploitation.190 Though this government-led 
investment model remains in place, the government began 
implementing a fund-based system in 1999, first establishing the 
Interim Revenue Stabilization Fund and then, in 2007, the Heritage 
and Stabilization Fund—a fund designed to accomplish both national 
savings and budget stabilization.191 The Heritage and Stabilization 
Fund has no mandatory funding amounts, only catching those 
revenues that happen to be in excess of the amount projected by the 
government for budgetary purposes.192 The fund is managed by the 
Trinidadian central bank and the legislature is allowed to withdraw its 
funds if annual petroleum revenue falls below 10 percent of the 
budgeted projections.193 Whether in the Fund194 or in the expenditure 
 
 187. Justine Ram, Distribution and Sustainable Development in a Natural Resource-Based 
Economy 12–13 (July, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci.), 
http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/469/1/Ram_Distribution%20and%20Sustainable%20Development%20i
n%20a%20Natural%20Resource-Based%20Economy.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ZS9-G49L]. 
 188. Id. at 13. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Ronald Sanders, Trinidad and Tobago: Time to Ease off the Gas, GLOBAL: THE 
INT’L BRIEFING, http://www.global-briefing.org/2013/01/time-to-ease-off-the-gas [http://perma.
cc/5Z3J-6GA9] (arguing that the Trinidadian government should abandon its practice of 
expanding its petroleum sector and instead invest petroleum rents in other sectors to diversify 
the economy). 
 191. Gregory McGuire, Heritage and Stabilisation Fund: Did We Get It Right?, in A REPORT 
OF THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT NETWORK (SDNTT) 88, 93 
(Nov. 2009), http://thecropperfoundation.org/sdn/documents/Final_Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/
G6JH-SXJJ]. 
 192. Id. at 94. To be precise, the government must deposit all revenues exceeding 10 percent 
of the projected levels and all amounts below 10 percent may be deposited at the discretion of 
the minister of finance. Id. 
 193. Id. at 95. 
 194. See id. (“[T]he rules provide for an annual audit by the Auditor General, as well as the 
submission of quarterly and annual financial statements to the Minister.”). 
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of petroleum revenues in the national budget,195 the government puts 
a strong de jure emphasis on transparency, requiring broad 
disclosures on finances as well as the financial interests of any 
government officials in the petroleum industry.196 
As the similar names of its funds suggests, Ghana has also drawn 
inspiration from Trinidad and Tobago’s regime for petroleum-
revenue management,197 but such reliance is likely misguided. Much of 
the Trinidadian success is premised on the expertise cultivated over 
decades of projecting and exploiting petroleum revenues, which is as 
of yet absent in Ghana. Moreover, the Trinidadian system is designed 
for a much smaller nation198 with substantially larger hydrocarbon 
reserves199 and substantially more per capita wealth,200 which naturally 
suggests that it was designed with different priorities and to meet 
different objectives than might be best for Ghana.201 As such, Ghana 
likely should not seek any further inspiration from the Trinidadian 
system. 
Although none of these systems provide an off-the-shelf solution 
to Ghana’s risks of the resource curse due to the different conditions 
prevailing in these countries, they do provide important lessons that 
inform the following proposal. Effective administration of petroleum 
 
 195. See Gregory McGuire, Dennis Pantin, Dale James & Navin Seeterram, A Guide for 
Monitoring the Management of Oil and Gas Resources in Trinidad and Tobago, in A REPORT OF 
THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT NETWORK (SDNTT), supra note 
191, at 2, 62 (summarizing the laws mandating transparency in Trinidad and Tobago’s oil-
revenue scheme). 
 196. Trinidad and Tobago: Resource Governance Index, NAT. RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 
INST., http://www.resourcegovernance.org/our-work/country/trinidad-and-tobago [http://perma.
cc/4TCT-S3LH]. 
 197. Gyampo, supra note 1, at 8. 
 198. Trinidad and Tobago is a nation of approximately 1.2 million people. The World 
Factbook: Trinidad & Tobago, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html [http://perma.cc/TV3H-SKFZ] (last updated June 
20, 2014) [hereinafter T&T Factbook]. Ghana has a population almost twenty-one times larger, 
at 25 million. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 199. Trinidad and Tobago has reserves of approximately 728 million barrels of crude oil and 
13.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Trinidad & Tobago, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TTO [http://perma.cc/4TXY-D2H2] (last 
updated Oct., 2014). Ghana, on the other hand, has reserves of 615 million barrels of crude oil 
and only 769 billion cubic feet of natural gas. 2013 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. 
 200. Trinidad and Tobago’s GDP per capita is approximately US$20,000, T&T Factbook, 
supra note 198, whereas Ghana’s is US$3,500, Ghana Factbook, supra note 45.  
 201. For example, as one might expect of a wealthier nation, there is less need for the fund 
to serve as an independent generator of national wealth to support the public welfare. Indeed, it 
has been persuasively argued that the Trinidadian fund system subordinates the national-wealth 
objective to the budget-stabilization objective. McGuire, supra note 191, at 96–98. 
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revenues requires serious levels of transparency and monitoring in 
order to ensure that the funds are managed and spent appropriately 
and to avoid corruption. Indeed, to achieve such diligent monitoring 
typically requires either an institution with the kind of technocratic 
expertise and public charge of honesty as seen in Norway or Trinidad 
and Tobago, or parties with a clear and direct stake in the best 
administration of such funds, as in Alaska and Indonesia. Whether 
framed as public trust or public suspicion, effectively combatting the 
resource curse is premised on public confidence that those who 
manage their resources can and will be accountable for their success 
or failure. 
III.  THE IDEAL OF THE CITIZEN-SHAREHOLDER 
What Ghana needs, therefore, is a system that gives Ghanaians 
the ability and incentive to keep account of the nation’s oil revenues 
and ensure their use for public benefit and poverty reduction. Such a 
system should capitalize on Ghana’s democratic spirit and expertise 
in the petroleum industry while guaranteeing that those national 
assets are protected by an honest and impartial government. This 
system would be best accomplished by drawing on principles from 
corporate law accomplishing widespread dispersion of the benefits of 
oil production, giving individuals a clear stake in the management of 
petroleum resources, providing transparent access to information 
needed to ensure proper management of those resources, and then 
actually giving interested parties a medium through which to 
effectively exact proper management. 
Any legal regime that seeks to implement these principles in 
Ghana will have to be tailored to certain realities: the economy is 
largely based on commodity exports,202 the democratic institutions in 
place are strong but still fledgling,203 the government largely lacks the 
technocratic expertise and incentives to properly manage large 
amounts of excess capital,204 and the GNPC has a great deal of 
expertise in managing oil reserves accumulated over decades of 
operation.205 Both the political and economic risks of the resource 
curse can be mitigated through a system that keeps centralized 
 
 202. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra Parts I.C.1–2. 
 205. See supra note 2. 
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management directly accountable to the decentralized stakeholders,206 
provides those stakeholders economic benefits and incentives to 
remain engaged in governance and ensure a lack of corruption,207 and 
mandates that stakeholders have full access to information.208 In other 
words, Ghana should implement a system that resembles a 
corporation. 
The Ghanaian government should leave its property rights in 
Ghanaian oil in the GNPC and divest itself of all of its shares in the 
GNPC, issuing them pro rata to all Ghanaian voters through the 
voter-registration channels. The Ghanaian people have a property 
interest in the nation’s oil reserves, and this proposed system would 
allow them to bear the benefits and responsibilities thereof. 
Ghanaians would be entitled to receive the oil revenues through the 
dividend vehicle and to vote in elections for directors whose sole job 
would be to manage Ghana’s oil. Directors would have disclosure 
requirements through a proxy system that would likely be strictly 
enforced by a jealous government, which, in turn, would allow the 
Ghanaian citizenry, keen on their own financial gain, to demand the 
most efficient use of funds. Money would thereby be pulled out of the 
oil sector and pumped into the economy writ large, allowing the 
Ghanaian people to invest their money in their own interests, which 
would reduce both poverty and the risk of an enclave oil economy.209 
Moreover, this would curb the government’s overabundance of 
financial resources, incentivize it to manage its oil revenues more 
carefully, reduce the risk of corruption, and allow democracy to run 
properly.210 
This regime could allow Ghana to reduce the comingling of 
politics and monetary gain by disaggregating them: governance (with 
politicians and regulators responsible to voters), and resource 
exploitation (with directors and managers responsible to citizen-
shareholders). Because constituents of government and owners of 
Ghana’s oil are one and the same, Ghana’s use of a corporation 
would likely enhance democratic principles. Thus, the risks of the 
 
 206. Cf. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2011) (requiring annual election of corporate 
directors). 
 207. Cf. id. § 170 (authorizing the issuance of corporate dividends to stockholders). 
 208. Cf. id. § 220(b) (granting shareholders the right to access corporate book and records). 
 209. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text (describing the individual benefits of 
Alaska’s dividend payout system).  
 210. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (noting the positive effects of Alaska’s 
dividend-payout system on good governance and democratic accountability). 
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resource curse may be overcome by using the corporate form in 
tandem with democracy to increase popular control, transparency, 
and dispersion of petroleum rents. 
Aside from the pragmatic justification that this corporate-law 
suggestion could help Ghana avoid the resource curse, there is a 
strong justification in the law of property as well. It is relatively 
uncontroversial to assert that the people of Ghana (as represented by 
their democratically elected government) own the nation’s petroleum 
reserves. The warm reception to the Norwegian Minister of the 
Environment’s assertion that the people of Ghana, like the people of 
Norway, own their country’s petroleum resources makes this 
abundantly clear.211 However, it is not necessarily obvious why title to 
these publicly owned resources should be vested in the government 
apart from the obvious practical reason that the government can 
efficiently represent the interests of all these “owners” as a party to a 
contract. Property rights, whether vested in an individual, family, or 
community, tend to be conceptualized in absolute terms,212 which is 
often characterized as “dominion”213 or the possession of “a bundle of 
legal relations—rights, powers, privileges, immunities.”214 So if the 
people of Ghana own their petroleum resources, why should their 
access to their bundle of rights be only tangential, through a 
government that has its own interests and might not be best equipped 
to manage their petroleum revenues effectively? Issuing shares would 
provide a much more efficient and fair means of recognizing the 
people’s ownership of Ghana’s petroleum by allowing everyone to 
share directly in the financial benefits of production, and by allowing 
for targeted voting aimed solely at the management of petroleum 
resources without other political considerations, which would make 
for more effective exercise of dominion over resources. It has already 
been persuasively argued that the international norm of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources vests in peoples, not 
 
 211. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.  
 212. See Frank K. Nyame & Joseph Blocher, Influence of Land Tenure Practices on 
Artisanal Mining Activity in Ghana, 35 RESOURCES POL’Y 47, 48 (2010) (describing how 
customary land holders, such as clan heads, hold absolute title to their lands on behalf of their 
people). 
 213. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development 
of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 331 (1980). 
 214. Arthur L. Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429, 429 
(1922).  
SIMPSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/2016  8:19 AM 
2016] THE IDEAL OF THE CITIZEN-SHAREHOLDER 1317 
governments,215 and that the resource curse is combatted by 
governments that grant strong individual property rights,216 so issuing 
shares of the GNPC while leaving petroleum rights in the corporation 
is justified both under the law of property and as a matter of policy. 
That a corporate board of directors is directly elected by 
shareholders would likely provide significant benefit to Ghana by 
helping to align the interests of managers with those of the people 
petroleum production is supposed to benefit.217 This would help to 
counteract the risk of the resource curse by giving individuals a stake 
in the management of petroleum resources and by giving them a 
medium for exacting control. Under the current system, the GNPC is 
accountable to the government, which, in a sense, acts as proxy for 
the Ghanaian people.218 However, the government has many 
conflicting incentives that produce the common symptoms of the 
resource curse, and is thus not optimally equipped to ensure that 
petroleum management inures to the benefit of the people.219 
Furthermore, it is logically more difficult for voters to keep 
institutions like the GNPC or the government itself accountable 
specifically for petroleum management when there are infinitely 
many other concerns which might influence voting decisions in 
general elections. By disaggregating the elections into votes for 
directors and votes for public officials, Ghanaian voters—these new 
citizen-shareholders—would not be forced to choose between 
candidates who might be best for their petroleum resources and those 
who might otherwise be best for the nation. This way, those whose 
interests are ultimately at stake would have direct say in the 
management of their resources, which would help reduce the 
significant agency costs that currently strain this resource-rich 
 
 215. Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and People’s Ownership of Natural Resources 
in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33, 49 (2006). 
 216. See Karol Boudreaux & Tiernan Mennen, Reverse the Curse: How Can Oil Help the 
Poor?, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 182, 183 (2014) (arguing that “strong property rights are critical to 
sustainable economic growth” because they empower individuals to live productively). 
 217. This would likely also entail a financial incentive for serving as a director, so that 
candidates would want to seek election by managing the revenues to the citizen-shareholders’ 
benefit. 
 218. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 219. See, e.g., supra notes 49, 91–95 and accompanying text (noting Ghana’s tendency 
towards pork-barrel politics and lack of sufficient limitations on spending from petroleum 
funds); supra notes 104–08 (recounting the incentives towards maximizing short-term profits 
while undermining any positive externalities which might accrue to the people of Ghana). 
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economy.220 An additional benefit to the political economy of 
disaggregating voting in this manner would be a reduction in the 
importance of resource-related issues in the election of public 
officials, a reduction in the corrupting influence of oil, and a 
strengthening of Ghana’s status as the brightest shining lodestar in 
Africa. 
Ghana has the infrastructure to make such a system work. It has 
a pool of highly qualified and experienced professionals in the 
petroleum industry in the GNPC221 who could serve on the board of 
directors. It has a sophisticated voter-registration and polling 
system,222 which could be put to good use for registering GNPC 
citizen-shareholders and administering votes on directors, helping to 
reduce administrative costs and giving Ghana’s people an effective 
medium for controlling their petroleum resources. Registering 
citizen-shareholders could be accomplished simply by issuing shares 
pro rata to all registered voters, which would have the further benefit 
of incentivizing voter registration. In addition to voting, corporate 
shareholders often keep management accountable by selling their 
shares, which requires a secondary securities market;223 in this 
particular context, however, such infrastructure is neither necessary 
nor appropriate.224 A major purpose of this proposal is to address the 
need for wide public participation in the management and benefits of 
petroleum resources. Fulfilling this purpose would require restrictions 
on transferability to keep the shares from concentrating in the hands 
of a concentrated group of wealthy buyers in urban centers.225 Indeed, 
 
 220. See supra Part II. 
 221. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 222. See generally Representation of the People Law, PNDCL 284 (1992) (Ghana), 
http://www.ec.gov.gh/pndcl-284 [http://perma.cc/N2UX-J7M4] (detailing statutory procedures 
for registering voters and polling votes).  
 223. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 95 (1985). 
 224. It is useful here to reaffirm that this proposal does not suggest adopting a mirror image 
of a large corporation as might be familiar in the developed world. The circumstances of dealing 
with a nation’s petroleum revenue are too unique for that. Rather, this proposal seeks to 
employ certain principles of corporate law to craft a solution to this public problem. Hence the 
term citizen-shareholder instead of simply shareholder. 
 225. Some might argue that absent free transferability of shares, the corporate analogy is 
not productive because it is so key to how corporations are run; however, it is important to 
remember that the formality of the corporate form provides additional benefits, which is why 
there are many closely held corporations that restrict alienation of shares. See Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 
273–74 (1986) (noting the common practice of restraining alienation of shares in close 
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this proposal is premised on the assumption that a corporate-law 
solution would provide citizen-shareholders an incentive to stay 
engaged in the voting process and exact best management of 
petroleum revenues. 
A sort of proxy system will be necessary to reduce the 
administrative costs of voting and to help inform the voters about 
how the candidates align with citizen-shareholder interests.226 Two 
main principles must be accounted for in such a proxy system in order 
to achieve the transparency needed to allow citizen-shareholders to 
effectively control their resources: avoiding hegemony of incumbents 
and ensuring widespread understanding of the key issues in any 
election.227 These principles are necessary to avoid the retrenchment 
of leaders indicative of the resource curse and to facilitate the most 
efficient control exercised by citizen-shareholders. It would likely be 
most efficient and fair to make use of independent organizations like 
the PIAC to ensure full disclosure of the relevant issues on a 
widespread basis. Basic proxy disclosures provided by the PIAC 
could be complimented by the many NGOs active in Ghana,228 in 
addition to individual candidates campaigning for election to the 
board. By injecting some independent and competing forces in the 
proxy-disclosure market, this system would likely help unseat poorly 
performing incumbents and to encourage widespread understanding. 
Preventing alienation of shares would force disclosure to rural citizen-
shareholders the same as to urbanites, forcing candidates and 
organizations to consider how to overcome the problem of 
 
corporations). Moreover, although concentrated ownership is commonly touted in America and 
elsewhere as one way of ensuring better corporate oversight given the incentives of passive 
investors to free ride on the efforts of others, these does not seem quite so relevant in this 
example where few Ghanaians are likely to have substantial, diversified investment portfolios 
and given the civic importance of oil. Transfer restrictions are well known as a matter of 
contract, id., and securities regulation, see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2015) (requiring that 
unregistered securities issued under Regulation D in the United States must include transfer 
restrictions). Using either method would likely be easy to implement in Ghana considering that 
the each share would be bound up with voter registration. See supra note 222 and accompanying 
text. 
 226. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. 395, 399–408 (1983) (arguing that voting and proxy systems are an integral part of the 
contracting that forms a corporation as shareholders seek to manage the agency costs associated 
with electing others to manage their assets).  
 227. The above comparative study implies a need for a countervailing force to restrain 
petroleum-revenue managers and for transparency in order to combat the resource curse. See 
supra Part II.  
 228. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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widespread illiteracy in Ghana.229 However it is ultimately structured, 
such a proxy system would help to provide the transparency needed 
to allow citizen-shareholders to hold management accountable to the 
best and most socially responsible use of petroleum resources and 
revenues. 
The final component of this system is mandatory dividend 
distribution, which would help spread the benefits of petroleum 
widely throughout Ghana to avoid concentration of wealth and 
enclave economies, and to provide citizen-shareholders an incentive 
to exact good governance of petroleum revenues. Under this 
proposal, the GNPC board would be required to issue an annual 
dividend to its citizen-shareholders when its cash holdings surpassed a 
certain threshold. Payment of oil revenues directly to citizens is often 
seen as an important tool for combating the resource curse, and 
scholars have advocated direct cash contributions to the Ghanaian 
citizenry.230 This is important because it takes the money out of the 
hands of the government, which may be corrupted by it, and instead 
puts it in the hands of ordinary citizens, on whose lives it would have 
a direct impact.231 Pulling money out of the oil sector and putting it in 
the pockets of all Ghanaians reduces the risk of an enclave oil 
economy by enabling the people to spend or invest their money in 
whatever sector they choose. Moreover, adding a mandatory dividend 
to this corporate law proposal can further help to combat the 
resource curse by giving citizen-shareholders an incentive to vote and 
to ensure best management of petroleum resources—part of their 
livelihood depends upon it. When coupled with the robust, targeted 
governance system of the corporate form, the dividend should 
provide a highly effective means of curtailing the resource curse in 
Ghana, where democratic institutions are still growing. 
There remains the issue of whether the Ghanaian government 
would actually accept such a proposal in which it cedes a major 
 
 229. Cf. Ghana Factbook, supra note 45 (noting a 76.6 percent literacy rate for Ghana). This 
is of course not to say that Ghana should legally mandate that shareholders be literate. Rather, 
it is simply an observation that literacy is necessary in order for disclosure and governance to be 
meaningful. Thus, this system could provide a structural inventive for overcoming illiteracy, or, 
at the very least, for finding effective means of transmitting information to the illiterate. 
 230. See, e.g., Moss & Young, supra note 12, at 13 (recommending that Ghana adopt an 
Alaskan-style trust to pay dividends directly to citizens from oil extraction). Moss and Young 
suggest that this might be accomplished in several ways, including through a biometric-
identification system, which is already within the Bank of Ghana’s capability. Id. at 18–19. 
 231. Id. at 15–18. 
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portion of its revenue and power to another institution.232 Although 
this may seem farfetched, Ghanaian leaders interested in good 
governance might be motivated by compelling policy rationales. First, 
it is important to note that the government would not be giving up 
sovereignty. By relinquishing its GNPC shares and leaving the 
corporation property rights in the nation’s oil reserves, the 
government would give up ownership, not the right to regulate or tax. 
This is key because, with tax revenues on the line, the Ghanaian 
government would have an incentive to regulate the industry 
effectively and sustainably. Given the existence of a rival institution, 
the government would have an interest in exercising its sovereignty 
by jealously enforcing the proposed voting, proxy, and dividend rules; 
instituting a regulatory regime for oil extraction;233 and ensuring full 
tax collection.234 The government would still retain large petroleum 
revenues through corporate taxes235 and would gain another large 
portion via personal income taxes, allowing it to build its taxation 
capacity. This would also reduce risks that Ghana might not be able 
to absorb excess capital or to get returns on its oil funds.236 This 
regime would prove more beneficial to the government and people of 
Ghana alike by encouraging optimal utilization of oil revenues and by 
aligning incentives for sustainable democratic and economic growth 
through a regulated petroleum industry that is clearly separate from 
the government. 
Therefore, in order to avoid the risks of the resource curse, 
Ghana should adopt the above corporate-law solution based in the 
ideal of the citizen-shareholder. This regime would eschew the risks 
of the resource curse by reducing the overall reliance on commodity 
 
 232. The Ghanaian government might choose a middle-ground approach by issuing shares 
to its citizens, while retaining a stake in the company. This might be more palatable as it would 
still hold direct influence over the GNPC and have access to more petroleum revenues; 
however, this is not ideal, as it undermines the benefits of separating governance from 
petroleum production. 
 233. Ghana has not instituted a regulatory regime independent from the government’s 
production interest. See supra notes 2, 9 and accompanying text. However, it is likely important 
to a sustainable petroleum economy, as seen in Norway. See supra note 147 and accompanying 
text. 
 234. One of the major symptoms of the resource curse is the tendency of resource-rich 
governments to put less effort into tax collection and other more sustainable sources of income 
in favor of relying on resource rents. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 235. For example, in 2013, 25.63 percent of all government petroleum revenues came from 
corporate income tax on the private participants in the petroleum industry. 2013 ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 11, at 21. 
 236. See supra Figures 1–3. 
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exports and the risk of corruption and facilitating economic and 
democratic development by aligning the incentives of those in charge 
of petroleum with those of the people. Ghana has the infrastructure 
needed to make this work, and the introduction of a strong 
institutional rival to the government would incentivize better 
regulation and taxation of petroleum revenues while building on the 
democratic institutions that have made Ghana the envy of Africa. 
CONCLUSION 
The jubilation attending Ghana’s discovery of large oil reserves 
has overshadowed the risk that the nation might succumb to the 
resource curse, and, to some extent, this is rightfully so. Ghana is one 
of the world’s most promising democracies and has put in place a 
system for managing its petroleum revenues. Much can and should be 
made of Ghana’s promise and capabilities, and this is precisely why 
Ghana needs a legal regime for managing petroleum revenues that is 
tailored to its strengths, but is also keenly aware that Ghana is still a 
young democracy with serious poverty problems and an economy 
rendered fragile by its reliance on commodity exports. The right 
system is needed to ensure that Ghana is able to fulfill its promise as a 
prosperous and stable democracy. 
Sadly, the current system falls short in this regard and leaves 
Ghana exposed to the curse. This Note proposes a solution by 
drawing on principles of corporate law. This proposal, based on the 
ideal of the citizen-shareholder, draws on the efficiencies and 
incentives of the corporate form to foster sustained economic and 
democratic growth. By separating the government from direct 
participation in petroleum production and by giving the public a 
direct stake therein, Ghana can avoid the resource curse and remain a 
model for African democracy. 
 
